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Delusions in US-Russian Relations
By Pavel Felgenhauer
Russo-American relations have known so many ups and downs that they resemble a 
roller coaster. The pre-1973 détente collapsed into a global confrontation with wars by 
proxy in Central America, Africa and an all but direct US-USSR military standoff in 
Afghanistan. The “end of the Cold War” in the late 1980s and the ensuing warm 
relations, which almost resulted in an alliance between Moscow and Washington in the 
first half of the 1990s, ended in acute acrimony over NATO expansion and the conflict in 
Kosovo. Another attempt to build an axis after 9/11, an alliance in the war against a 
presumed common enemy–terrorism–has in the last several months deteriorated into 
what many commentators call the worst state of Russo-American relations in 20 years 
(since the aborted summit between Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev 
in Reykjavik in October 1986 on arms control).
During the time when Communism ruled in Moscow, the inability of the United States 
and Russia to build a stable, mutually-beneficial relationship could be explained by 
ideological differences. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the acute ideological divide 
largely seemed to have disappeared and Russia officially pledged its commitment to 
democracy and a market economy, but the relationship appears to have become even 
more wobbly.
In the run-up to the St. Petersburg G8 Summit last July, the administrations of 
Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin evidently tried to iron out differences over 
Iran, North Korea and Russia’s WTO accession in the tradition of what former US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger used to call “realpolitik.” The Iran and North Korea 
nuclear issues are among Washington’s main foreign policy concerns, while the Kremlin 
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wants very much to conclude its WTO accession. Hours before the beginning of the 
summit, Russian Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin told reporters that an agreement had 
been reached on foreign access to the Russian financial market, that a protocol with the 
US on Russia’s WTO admission would be signed during or just before the G8 summit, 
and that Russia’s formal accession to the organization would follow in a couple of 
months.
Of course, no protocol was signed and this perceived public humiliation infuriated the 
Russian élite and the Kremlin. The American explanation of the delay, that there was no 
sense in signing a deal that might be knocked down by Congress, which must remove 
Russia from the Jackson-Vanic amendment for it to enter into the WTO, was not 
accepted as valid. In Moscow, Putin’s Kremlin can order the country’s legislature to vote 
into law virtually anything, and even in the 1990s, President Boris Yeltsin’s 
administration could, in most cases, bribe the Duma into voting as requested on issues 
deemed serious.
Vyacheslav Nikonov–a Kremlin-connected political strategist of Putin’s ruling party 
United Russia–lamented after the St. Petersburg summit: “We have realized, they will 
never allow us into the WTO and must build our policy in accordance with that.” After 
the G8 Summit, Russo-American relations took a nosedive that is continuing, 
encouraged by constant mutual misunderstandings in military, political and economic 
matters.
A meeting on August 27 in Fairbanks, Alaska, between Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Ivanov, was planned as a somewhat 
informal, friendly get-together that could keep military-to-military relations on an even 
keel, while WTO accession and other outstanding problems were being hammered out 
by trade officials and diplomats. The scheme seemed to work—until the joint final press 
conference, when Rumsfeld suddenly advanced a plan, opposed by some in Congress, 
to convert some Navy Trident long-range ballistic missiles from a nuclear to a 
conventional role for potential use against terrorist targets anywhere in the world.
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Ivanov expressed his reservations and argued that “there are different solutions,” such 
as the use of cruise missiles with conventional warheads that would not be mistaken for 
a possible nuclear strike. Rumsfeld responded: “We would be happy to see the Russian 
government decide to do the same thing.” Later he added: “I hope my friend Sergei 
takes that home and discusses it and calls me up on the phone and says he thinks 
that’s a terrific idea.” As reported by AP: Otherwise the news conference “was 
harmonious.”
Ivanov was not thrilled. Instead, our Defense Ministry suddenly called off US-Russian 
military exercises that were scheduled to take place during September in the Nizhny 
Novgorod oblast. Russo-NATO peacekeeping exercises that were preplanned for 
September in the Pskov oblast also were cancelled at the last moment.
The official reason for the sudden cancellation of previously agreed joint military 
exercises was blamed on a legal technicality—the absence of legislation allowing the 
presence of foreign troops on Russian territory. However, in previous years, the 
absence of such legislation had not prevented similar military games. A Duma Defense 
Committee staffer told me last month that they were ready to pass the required 
legislation into law any time, but were not given the go-ahead by the government.
A high-ranking US diplomat told me that during the talks in Fairbanks, the Trident 
conversion plan was not discussed at all. It was only during the press conference that 
Rumsfeld suddenly began to speak out, embarrassing Ivanov, who could not 
immediately contact aides while facing journalists, and who was unsure of the 
proposal’s meaning or what to say about it.
Rumsfeld’s “shock and awe” approach sent diplomats and generals in Moscow into a 
scramble. Ten days after Fairbanks, a high-ranking Russian Foreign Ministry official 
begged me to tell him whether I had any idea about what the Americans actually 
intended to achieve with the unexpected Trident conversion plan. Sadly, I could not offer 
a comprehensive explanation.
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Ivanov believed that he had been intentionally embarrassed and the Russian military 
and diplomats assumed that the US was planning some deception to cheat on agreed-
upon nuclear arms deployments. Since the exact nature of the presumed American 
“sham” was not fully clear, the worst possible scenarios were assumed. Russo-
American military-to-military relations deteriorated dramatically.
A month after Fairbanks, on September 27, four Russian military intelligence officers 
were arrested in Georgia, charged with espionage. On October 2, the men were 
released and sent to Moscow. A high-ranking US diplomat told me that Washington, 
fearful that the consequences of the Russo-Georgian standoff might escalate into a 
military conflict, had been pressing the Georgians to release them. However, the 
Kremlin did not appreciate the efforts that got the alleged Russian spies extricated.
On October 2, Bush phoned Putin, apparently to solicit moderation in the dispute with 
Georgia, but was rebuffed. The Kremlin press service released an official statement 
after Bush’s phone call about “the unacceptability” of intervention by “third parties” in the 
fray. Pro-Kremlin commentators and the government-controlled media in Moscow were 
more explicit, accusing the US of provoking the entire spy scandal to eliminate Russian 
influence in the Transcaucasus region, while the apparent Washington-induced release 
of the officers was interpreted as evidence that the Saakashvili regime was an American 
puppet. (Another popular version circulated in Moscow: The US ordered the Russian 
officers’ release in order to give Bush a pretext to intervene directly in the conflict.)
Apparently it has never been fully understood in Washington how decisive the issue of 
actual material control of Russia’s putative “sphere of influence” is. The détente of the 
1970s collapsed with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, which Russian leaders 
believed was a legitimate defense of our “sphere of influence” against US intrusions, 
while the rest of the world considered it a blatant aggression.
The “strategic partnership” of the early 1990s collapsed because of the beginning of the 
process of NATO expansion and the NATO-led attack on Yugoslavia. The latest attempt 
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at alliance in the War on Terror after 9/11 is now in tatters because of the presumed 
intrusion of the US and the West into our backyard—the CIS.
The ruling élite in Moscow believes that any major stabilization and improvement of 
relations with the West must take into account Russia’s “legitimate interests”—meaning 
control of populations and landmasses. Today, as a hundred years ago, the foundation 
of any alliance or major mutual understanding is presumed in Russia to require a 
comprehensive settlement of territorial “sphere of influence” problems.
In August 1993, Defense Minister Grachev said at a meeting in the Russian General 
Staff: “The present economic and political situation in the CIS countries raises hopes 
that soon we all will unite again. First into an economic, and then into a military and 
political union. So we must keep our military presence in the CIS and hold on to the old 
Soviet frontiers.”
General Pavel Grachev was ousted as Defense Minister in June 1996, but the above 
statement from 1993 sounds as if it had been uttered in 2006 by one of Putin’s 
associates, or by Putin himself. Russia continues to maintain military infrastructure or 
combat troops in all of the CIS countries. Russian troops continue to remain in Georgia 
and Moldova against the explicitly expressed will of the local governments and against 
pledges given by Yeltsin in Istanbul in 1999 at an OSCE summit. Russia also has 
sustained, and in some cases increased, its military presence in Central Asia.
Western nations and militaries in most cases view foreign peacekeeping operations as 
a costly distraction of men and resources: The earlier the mission ends, the better. 
Russian CIS peacekeeping missions resemble, in essence, the Syrian peacekeeping 
deployment in Lebanon from 1976 until 2005: Their goal is to stay as long as possible, 
to use their deployment to exert covert influence and to leave only when kicked out.
Peacekeeping operations in the CIS are seen as instruments with which to promote 
Russia’s main strategic aim—to increase and consolidate Moscow’s military and political 
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influence. Any resolution of the so-called “frozen” ethnic/separatist conflicts within the 
CIS that could lead to the withdrawal of Russian troops is viewed as unacceptable.
The Kremlin’s interpretation of a true “sphere of influence” definitely involves, today as 
before, the limited sovereignty of states under Russian control. In 2003, the Kremlin 
promoted a peace plan of the Transdniestr conflict that envisaged a reunited 
confederate Moldova that would have neither a Defense Ministry nor a regular state 
army, but  that  instead would have a permanent Russian military presence. The 
eventual rejection of this plan by Kishinev created serious and lasting tensions with 
Moscow. Within the Kremlin, it was believed that Western intrigues by NATO, the EU 
and the OSCE had caused the failure of this so-called “Dmitri Kozak plan” to reunite 
Moldova under Russian supremacy.
Today the Kremlin, Foreign and Defense Ministries, Duma deputies and other officials, 
openly discuss the upcoming recognition of the independence and possible future 
annexation of the self-proclaimed states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestr. 
In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian peacekeeping efforts have lost any pretense of 
impartiality. At the same time, the Kremlin is supporting anti-Saakashvili exiles and 
opponents such as the former Georgian security chief Igor Georgadze (who is accused 
of masterminding the failed assassination of Eduard Shevardnadze in 1996), in an 
attempt to install a weak pro-Moscow regime in Tbilisi.
The mirage of a new union to replace the old Soviet one has obsessed the ruling élite in 
Moscow, and the military, diplomatic and security chiefs of the 1990s and continues to 
do so now. This aspiration of revenge and restoration is perhaps the main item of 
“continuity” in Russian policy over the last decade. Of course, it is well understood that it 
is impossible fully to recreate the old, great Soviet Union, but some “integration of the 
CIS” under Moscow’s leadership and domination into something resembling the EU, or 
even a more integrated structure was, and is, a primary policy goal that dominated the 
1990s and continues to dominate Russia’s economic and national security decision-
making today.
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Russia’s ruling class always has believed that control of vast territories is key to political 
survival. During the détente of the 1970s, Moscow wanted “strategic parity” with the US. 
What we meant by that, in essence, was: Give us our half of the globe and keep out. In 
the 1990s, NATO expansion incorporating former Soviet republics was called by many 
in Moscow “a red line,” on which the West must never tread.
After 9/11, Putin put forward what he believed was a decent, modest and 
straightforward offer: An alliance with the US and the West in the War on Terror in 
exchange for the CIS to be recognized as our undisputed sphere of influence. Putin 
openly acknowledged that the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania no 
longer fall into our aspired “sphere.” As a gesture of good will, Putin closed Russian 
military bases in Cuba and Vietnam and accepted without much public distress the 
denunciation of the 1972 ABM treaty, which for decades Moscow  had been defending 
frantically as “the backbone of international stability.”
Moscow could have offered other concessions; Putin was ready to bargain and trade 
horses in good faith. Arms control, Iran and other issues are important, but they are 
secondary to the “sphere”—the undisputed control of “our people,” our resources and 
lands. With the CIS under its thumb in the future, Russia could recreate itself into an 
empire. Without the CIS, it is forever doomed to the role of a second-class power.
The US and the West did, in fact, move half-way in our direction: The brutal war in 
Chechnya, the suppression of democracy and press freedoms in Russia were accepted 
tacitly. Putin got his “sphere,” but a significantly reduced one: only the territory of the 
Russian Federation, instead of the entire CIS. This has been seen by many as 
treachery: The West gobbled up our concessions and gave nothing in return. The 
growing anti-Western, anti-American paranoia in Russia has a firm material base in the 
present and is not merely a vestige of the Cold War, as is sometimes assumed in the 
West.
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Dealing with Russia is never an easy task, but ignoring the essence of the underlying 
problems is perilous. Putin and Ivanov are not “friends” or “partners,” they are not 
somehow members of a pro-Western elite which was lost in the woods, but has 
returned to join the happy family. Incorrect assumptions only exacerbate existing 
difficulties.
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